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THE POPULAR REFERENDUM DEVICE AND
EQUALITY OF VOTING RIGHTS - HOW
MINORITY SUSPENSION OF THE LAWS
SUBVERTS "ONE PERSON-ONE VOTE"
IN THE STATES
Jerry W. Calvertt
INTRODUCTION
Americans have always been ambivalent about the legitimacy of
their government. On the one hand, the holy writs of the Declaration of
Independence and the U.S. Constitution are items of pietistic reverence;'
on the other, few have actually read these revered and sacred texts, 2 and
fewer still understand their historic and contemporary significance. 3
Similarly, Americans rhetorically honor elections and representative gov-
ernment while almost half of them don't bother to vote; nonetheless, they
tend to hold the actual occupants of elective and representative office in
vituperative contempt.4 This contempt and distrust of governmental in-
stitutions is not confined to the United States, nor is American respect for
governmental institutions necessarily less than in other democratic coun-
tries.5 What is, however, rather unique to the American scene is the in-
genious ways in which institutional arrangements are designed. On the
one hand, both the separation-of-powers and checks-and-balances sys-
tems, at both the federal and state levels, are designed to hedge and qual-
ify the majority rule principle; on the other hand, there is a contradictory
impulse to expand the majority rule principle, especially at the state
t Professor of Political Science and Head of the Department of Political Science, Mon-
tana State University. Author of The Gilbraltar: Labor and Socialism in Butte. Other areas
of specialization, besides labor history and Equal Protection issues, are election law reforms
and voter turnout, and the politics of environmental protection. The author was also a co-
appellant in the case discussed in this article.
1 RicHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMEmcAN PoLmcAL TRADITION 12-13 (1974).
2 HERBERT McCLOSKY & ALIDA BRIL, DIMENSIONS OF ToLERANCE: WHAT AMmu.
cANs BEaVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES (1983).
3 Id. at 52-53; Bob Baker, Times Poll: Nation Divided On What The Law Should Allow,
L.A. TIMs, Dec. 14, 1991, at 28.
4 Ronald Brownstein, Survey of Political Leanings Sees 3rd Party Idea Gaining, L.A.
TImms, Sept. 21, 1994, at 1, 16; NORMAN LuTrEG & MICHAEL GANT, AMERICAN ELEcroRAL
BEHAVIOR, 1952-1992, 131-51 (1995).
5 G. Bingham Powell, Jr., American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective, 80 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 17, 18-20 (1986).
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pie, especially at the state level, through the direct democratic devices of
initiative and popular referendum.6
This paper's central thesis is that the popular referendum process7
perverts the majority rule principle of democratic government because, in
most states, a successful petition drive to force a referendum vote also
suspends the law in question until the public has voted on it. Specifi-
cally, this paper argues that such suspension is a legislative act, and as
such, it should be required to adhere to the same constitutional standards
and restrictions that apply to actions taken by elected and representative
legislative bodies. Just as our constitutional system would not tolerate an
institutional arrangement permitting a minority of state legislators or lo-
cal government officials to enact new laws (or suspend existing laws
previously approved by a full majority), we should not allow a minority
of "the People," through the referendum process, to act as if they were
the majority.
Although this paper focuses primarily on the constitutional issues
surrounding the popular referendum, it is important to note that referen-
dum and initiative ride together theoretically and practically. The initia-
tive process permits the placement of a proposed law or constitutional
amendment upon the election ballot once supporters have gained the re-
quired number of petition signatures as specified by state law. In addi-
tion, the initiative device may be used to repeal an existing law; but
unlike the popular referendum, initiative petitions cannot suspend a law
prior to a public vote of approval or repeal.8 Currently, twenty-one states
provide for lawmaking by initiative, and seventeen permit constitutional
amendments by the initiative process. 9
Twenty-four states provide for the popular referendum (also called a
petition for referendum);' 0 in twenty of these states, the contested law is
suspended once the referendum petition has received the required
number of signatures." The suspension of an enacted law is generally
accomplished by obtaining either the signatures of a small minority of
eligible or registered voters, or the number of signatures equivalent to a
6 JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: POPULISM REVIVED 35-40, 68-
71(1986).
7 In short, the referendum process permits a minority of voters to petition the state to
place on an election ballot for public vote the question of whether an already-enacted law
should be repealed.
8 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 45-46.
9 DAVID MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 38-39 (1984).
10 Id. at 38-39; David Magleby, Taking The Initiative, 21 POL. SCI. & PUB. POL. 600-01
(1988).
11 ALEXANDER BorT, HANDBOOK OF ELECTION LAWS AND PRACTICES 280-82 (1990).
POPULAR REFERENDUM
small percentage of the votes cast for governor in the last general
election. 12
Unlike the initiative, the popular referendum has been used infre-
quently. 13 A principle reason for this rare usage is that those who wish to
force a suspension and public vote are constrained by short time dead-
lines in gathering the required number of signatures.14 In most states,
petitions with the required number of signatures must be filed with the
county clerk between 60 and 90 days after a legislative enactment,
whereas time frames for filing initiative petitions are usually much
longer, often one to two years. 15
Nevertheless, in 1993, Montana's referendum-suspension process
was used successfully to suspend a major tax reform bill that imposed a
flat rate income tax and provided approximately $70 million dollars in
general fund revenue to balance the state's budget for the biennium.
16
This successful petition drive forced Governor Marc Racicot to call the
Legislature into special session at the end of the year in order to
rebalance the state budget by cutting appropriations. 17 Between the an-
nouncement of the drive to suspend the tax and the final resolution of the
budget shortfall, a lawsuit was filed challenging the constitutionality of
Montana's popular referendum process on the grounds that it violated
provisions of both the United States and Montana constitutions.' 8 The
issues raised in Nicholson v. Cooney19 are the central points of discussion
in this paper:
" Does suspension of a duly enacted state law by a ref-
erendum petition signed by a minority of voters con-
stitute a violation of the "one person-one vote"
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment under
Reynolds v. Sims2" and subsequent Equal Protection
Clause voting cases?
" May a law be suspended even though the effects of
such a suspension clearly violate other relevant re-
quirements of a state's constitution (e.g., requiring a
balanced budget)?
12 Ken S. Choi, Financing State and Local Elections: Trends and Issues, in 1992-1993
BOOK OF THE STATES 283, 337 (1993).
13 David Magleby, Direct Democracy in the United States, in REFERENDUMS AROUND
THE WORLD 225-27 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1994).
14 Choi, supra note 12, at 337.
15 Id. at 331-32.
16 Plaintiffs' Brief In Support of Motion For Partial Summary Judgement at 6-12, Nich-
olson v. Cooney, 877 P.2d 486 (Mont. 1994) (No. 93-657).
17 Id. at 11-12.
18 Id. at 12-13.
19 877 P.2d 486 (Mont. 1994).
20 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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* May a minority of voters, in signing a petition to sus-
pend state law, accomplish a result that, if it had been
attempted by the state legislature, would have been a
clear violation of federal and state constitutional
requirements?
The political implications of the referendum-suspension provisions
found in the Montana constitution (and in many other state constitutions)
go well beyond the legal questions raised in Nicholson. The suspension
of a state tax in one rural state is not a single, isolated incident. Rather, it
represents one small piece of a nationwide movement to stop new taxes,
prevent tax increases, or reduce existing taxes, and thereby cripple the
capacity of state and local governments to govern effectively.21 Since
the successful drive in 1978, led by the late Howard Jarvis and Paul
Gann, to limit property taxes in California, the tax protest movement has
often been successful in using the initiative process to roll back existing
tax rates, to prohibit the imposition of specific taxes (e.g., sales taxes and
income taxes), and to place caps on state government spending and reve-
nue growth.22
Now, many people have discovered the suspension-referendum pro-
cess as a means to thwart legislative efforts to provide revenue sufficient
to cover government's obligatory provision of goods and services. If
suspension by a minority of voters is held to be constitutional, one can
expect energetic use of this device by anti-tax groups. Perhaps more im-
portantly, once the suspension option is fully appreciated, legislatures
may simply refrain from even attempting to raise existing taxes or to
impose new ones, given that suspension and a confirming public vote is
likely.
In 1994, four ballot measures (out of ten in circulation) qualified for
statewide ballots. These measures called for either 1) a required public
vote of approval for any tax increase or imposition of a new tax at the
state or local level, or 2) required a supermajority (usually a two-thirds
vote) of the legislature and other local units as the voting threshold to
increase existing taxes or impose new ones.23 Of these, one measure was
approved.24 Consequently, Nevada state legislators now need a
supermajority vote in order to raise taxes 2 5 thus joining Arizona, Colo-
21 Scott Mackey, Fiscal Issues Crowd November Ballots, STATE LEGISLATURES, Nov.
1992, at 29.
22 Scott Mackey, Initiative State Voters Have Their Say, STATE LEGISLATURES, Dec.
1992, at 14.
23 Major Garrett, No Taxation Without A Vote?: It's Coming Soon, WASH. TiIMi, Jul.
21, 1994, at A10; Robert Pear, Debate on Who is Heard in Initiatives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
1994, at Bll.
24 Voters Rebel Against Status Quo, STATE LEGISLATURES, Jan. 1995, at 18.
25 Id.
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rado, Oklahoma, and Washington, which already have such
requirements.2 6
THE REFERENDUM-SUSPENSION PROCESS
As previously indicated, 24 states (most in the West and Midwest)
provide for the right of the people to petition for a public vote on a bill
enacted by the state legislature. 27 To accomplish this task, objectors
must be sufficiently organized and dedicated to convince a relatively
small percentage of voters to sign the petitions and then submit them to
county clerks and recorders within a deadline established by law ranging
from 60 days to six months after legislative adjournment.2 8 See Table 1.
The percentage of signatures required to force a public vote on a
contested bill, which may also have to be distributed across a specific
proportion of state legislative districts or counties, ranges from a mini-
mum level equivalent to one percent of the population of the state (North
Dakota) or 10 percent of the eligible voters statewide, to a height of ten
percent in each of at least three-quarters of the state's counties (New
Mexico).29
Finally, the successful petition to mandate a public vote may or may
not suspend the contested law pending the general election referendum.
Four states do not stipulate suspension prior to a public vote (Alaska,
Nevada, North Dakota, and Oregon).30 See Table 2.
In most of the remaining 20 states, the contested law is automati-
cally suspended once the requisite signatures for the public vote have
been certified as valid and sufficient, but in some states, additional signa-
tures are required to suspend the contested law.3 1 In Montana, a public
vote will occur if petitions are signed by a number of registered voters
equivalent to 5 percent of the vote for governor in the last election with a
distribution requirement of signatures equivalent to 5 percent in at least
one-third of the State's 100 legislative districts.32 To suspend, the total
petition count (on the same petition) must be 15 percent of the vote for
governor in a majority of legislative districts (there is no statewide re-
quirement for suspension). 33 Nebraska and New Mexico also have addi-
tional signature requirements for suspension. See Table 1.34
26 Id.
27 Choi, supra note 12, at 329.
28 Id. at 337.
29 Id.
30 ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 5; NEv. CONST. art. IXX, §§ 1(2), 2(1); N.D. CONST. art.
III, §§ 1, 4, 5; OR. CONsT. art. IV, § 1(3).
31 Barr, supra note 11, at 280.
32 MoNT. CONST. art. III, §§ 5(1-2).
33 Id.
34 NEB. CONST. art. m11, § 3; N.M. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
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Table 1: Popular Referendum, Signature Requirements, and Deadlines
State Public Vote Suspension Deadline
Alaska 10% TV, 2/3 ED n.a. 90 days
Arizona 5% VG same 90 days
Arkansas 6% EV same 90 days
California 5% VG same 90 days
Colorado 5% VSS same 90 days
Idaho 5% VG same 60 days
Kentucky 5% VG same 4 months
Maine 10% VG same 90 days
Maryland 3% VG* same 90 days
Massachusetts 15,000 EV same 90 days
Michigan 5% VG same 90 days
Missouri 5% VG, 2/3 ED same 90 days
Montana 5% VG, 2/3 ED 15% VG, 51 ED 6 months
Nebraska 5% VG, CO 10% VG, 2/5 CO 90 days
Nevada 10% EV n.a. 120 GE
New Mexico 10% EV, 3/4 CO 25% EV, 3/4 CO 4 months GE
North Dakota 2% TP n.a. 90 days
Ohio 6% EV same 90 days
Oklahoma 5% VH same 90 days
Oregon 4% VG n.a. 90 days
South Dakota 5% VG same 90 days
Utah 10% VG same 90 days
Wyoming 10% TV, 2/3 CO same 90 days
Source: BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 12; various state constitutions.
Key to Symbols:
EV = total eligible voters
TP = total population TV = total voters in last general election
VG = total vote for governor VG* = no more than half from Baltimore
GE = total vote in last general election
VH = total vote for highest office VSS = total vote for secretary of state
ED = state legislative districts CO = counties
Of the 20 states that permit suspension of a disputed law, 19 except
certain subjects from the popular referendum and suspension process. 35
See Table 2. The most commonly excepted subjects are statutes desig-
nated as "emergency" laws (16 states) and those concerning appropria-
tions (14 states). 36 California and Ohio are the only two states that
except general revenue measures from the popular referendum, while
only Kentucky excludes property taxes.37 See Table 3.
In contrast to the renewed popularity of the initiative, evidence sug-
gests that state-level popular referendums have been used sparingly since
35 Bo-T, supra note 11, at 282.
36 Id.
37 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a); OHIO CONST. art. I, § l(d).
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Table 2: States With Popular Referendum and Constitutional
Restrictions
A. No Suspension Pending a Public Vote, No Subject Matter
Restrictions:
Nevada
Oregon
B. No Suspension Pending a Public Vote, Subject Restrictions:
Alaska
North Dakota
C. Suspension Pending a Public Vote, No Subject Restrictions:
Idaho
D. Suspension Pending a Public Vote, Subject Restrictions:
Arizona Massachusetts Oklahoma
Arkansas Michigan South Dakota
California Missouri Utah
Colorado Montana Washington
Kentucky Nebraska Wyoming
Maine New Mexico
Maryland Ohio
the benchmark year of 1978 when Californians approved the property
tax-slashing Proposition 13. For example, in 1988 there were 230 ques-
tions on state ballots.38 Of these, only 54 had been placed there by voter
petition, and of this number only 4 were popular referendum questions. 39
In Montana, the popular referendum device has been in place since 1907,
but was used only 10 times prior to the summer of 1993. The last time it
was used occurred in 1958 when the voters refused to repeal an increase
in the state liquor tax.40
But the threat of a popular referendum has served as a brake on
legislative discretion, especially with regards to tax legislation. Montana
remains one of five states that does not have a retail sales tax.41 In 1971,
the legislature submitted a 2 percent sales tax bill to the people for con-
sideration in a special election.42 It was soundly defeated, as were some
of its prominent legislative sponsors in the next general election. 43 As a
38 Austin Ranney, Elections '88: Referendums, PUBLIC OPINION, Jan.Feb. 1989, at 15..
39 Id.
40 EwLS WALDRON & PAUL B. WILSON, ATLAS OF MONTANA ELECTIONS, 1889-1976, at
215 (1978).
41 U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT FEA-
TURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 36-37 (1994).
42 WALDRON & WILSON, supra note 40, at 256.
43 MICHAEL MALONE, Er AL., MONTANA: A HISTORY OF Two CENTURIES 394-95, 397
(1991).
1997]
390 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6:383
Table 3: Items Excluded from Suspension by Popular Referendum
A. "Emergency" laws (Those deemed "immediately necessary for the pres-
ervation of public peace, health, and safety."):
Arizona Massachusetts** Oklahoma
Arkansas* Missouri South Dakota
California Nebraska Washington
Colorado New Mexico Wyoming
Maine** North Dakota
Maryland** Ohio**
* = emergency must be declared in the bill.
** = extraordinary majority required to declare an
emergency bill.
B. Appropriations
Arizona Michigan North Dakota
California Missouri Ohio
Colorado Montana South Dakota
Maryland Nebraska Wyoming
Massachusetts New Mexico
C. Taxes
California
Kentucky (property taxes only)
Ohio
D. Other Subjects
Courts (MA)
Election laws (CA)
Local and special legislation (NM, WY)
Relating to religious institutions and practices (MA)
School laws (NM)
Any law enacted by 2/3 of each house (UT)
consequence, the sales tax option remained largely a dead letter because
any potential introduction of a sales tax bill was threatened by the cer-
tainty of a successful effort to suspend it.44 For example, in the wake of
the drubbing handed the sales tax option in 1971, no sales tax bills were
introduced in the Montana Legislature until 10 years later.45 In the fol-
lowing years, 23 bills were introduced. However, only one bill, permit-
ting local incorporated cities statutorily designated as "resort
communities" to enact a local option sales tax if approved by the voters,
was enacted.46
44 Charles S. Johnson, Sales Tax Won't Last Without Constitutional Change, Legislator
Says, GREAT FALLS TRIB., Sept. 10, 1988, at 12A.
45 See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, HISTORY & FINAL STATUS OF BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS -
FIFTY-THIRD MONTANA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, Jan. 4, 1993 to Apr. 24, 1993 (1993) and
earlier reports of same series.
46 Id.
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THE MONTANA EXAMPLE
Montana's budget shortfalls and its heavy reliance on the personal
income tax and property tax prompted a second look. In April, 1993, the
Montana legislature enacted a 4 percent sales tax to be submitted to a
public vote in a June 1993 special election.47 (The threat of suspension
gave them no other option.) The proposed sales tax sought to reduce
income and property taxes while providing an additional $85 million to
balance the budget.48 But the legislature, in its wisdom, stipulated that if
the sales tax referendum failed, the income tax reform bill would auto-
matically take its place and have the same fiscal effects.49 The voters
were not given a clear choice between one or the other, but offered only
the sales tax. The majority of voters did not know that a comprehensive
income tax reform bill was quietly waiting in the wings should the sales
tax fail.50 The actual ballot language read:
FOR imposing a 4 percent sales tax and use tax as part
of comprehensive tax reform.
AGAINST imposing a 4 percent sales tax and use of tax
as part of comprehensive tax reform.5 1
In order to find out about the income tax alternative to the sales tax
referendum, the truly dedicated voter had to move beyond the simplified
ballot language and read the 31 pages of closely packed legal text in the
information pamphlet. Even there, one would only find very obscure
references to the income tax bill.5 2 Unlike Michigan, which offered vot-
ers the right to chose between one of two taxes without the option of
refusing all taxes, Montana's legislators, perhaps inadvertently, did not
give the voters a clear message that they had a choice in the manner used
to raise the desperately needed revenue.5 3 The sales tax proposal was
dead-on-arrival. In the June 1993 special election, 75 percent voted
against the sales tax. The proposition won a majority in only four of the
state's 956 electoral precincts.54
47 Id.
48 VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET FOR THE JuNE 8TH SPECIAL ELECTION ON LEGISLA-
TIvE REFERENDUM 111, at 2 (1993) [hereinafter VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLE].
49 Id.
50 Peter Johnson, 6 Out Of 10 Unaware Of Alternative To Sales Tax Plan, GREAT FALLS
TRIB., MAY 30, 1993, at IA, 4A.
51 VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET, supra note 48, at 2.
52 Id. at 31.
53 For insightful comment on giving voters a rational choice on ballot issues, see Alan
Ehrenhalt, Let the People Decide Between Spinach and Broccoli, GOVERNING, Jul. 1994, at 6-
7.
54 Mike Dennison, Final Tally: Tax Vote Was A Rare Shutout, GREAT FALLS TRaa., June
17, 1993, at IB; Jerry W. Calvert, The Tyranny Of The Minority, MONTANA PROFESSOR,
Spring 1994, at 23.
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Some of those who had most vigorously opposed the sales tax had
already threatened to suspend the income tax as well, and they proceeded
immediately to act on that threat.55 The Montana Constitution explicitly
gives individuals the opportunity to do this.56 Led by Professor Rob
Natelson of the University of Montana School of Law, a group called
Montanans for Better Government circulated a petition throughout the
state which read in part, "We, the undersigned Montana voters, propose
that the secretary of state place the attached House Bill Number 671,
passed by the Legislature on April 24, 1993, on the November 8, 1994
general election ballot and that House Bill Number 671 be suspended
until the election is held."'57
Considerable controversy attached to this petition drive. First, Pro-
fessor Natelson suggested that HB 671 imposed a general increase in
taxes on almost everyone, directly contradicting estimates offered by the
Montana Department of Revenue. Second, Professor Natelson, citing the
Census Bureau as his source, claimed that Montana was a high tax
state.58 But subsequent evidence, including the Census Bureau's own
data, suggested quite the opposite. When it was pointed out that his
figures were wrong and that Montana, in fact, ranked in the bottom two-
fifths in per capita tax collections,59 he acknowledged his error; however,
he subsequently continued to claim that Montana was a high-tax state.60
Third, those seeking to suspend HB 671 had a semi-hidden agenda
- to reduce state spending and thereby influence a redirection of state
government appropriations. 61 Since the state constitution explicitly ex-
55 Mike Dennison, Anti-Tax Petition Sent To Helena For Review, GREAT FALLS TRIB.,
June 2, 1993, at lB.
56 The Montana Constitution states:
(1) The people may approve or reject by referendum any act of the legislature except
an appropriation of money. A referendum shall be held either upon the order of the
legislature or upon petition signed by at least five percent of the qualified electors in
each of at least one-third of legislative representative districts. The total number of
signers must be at least five percent of the qualified electors of the state. A referen-
dum petition shall be filed with the secretary of state no later than six months after
the adjournment of the legislature which passed the bill.
(2) An act referred to the people is in effect until suspended by petitions signed by at
least 15 percent of the qualified electors in a majority of representative districts. If
so suspended the act shall become operative only after it has been approved at the
election, the result of which shall be determined and declared as provided by law.
MONT. CONST. art III, §§ 5(1-2) (emphasis added).
57 MONTANA SECRETARY OF STATE, PETITION To PLACE REFERENDUM No. 112 ON THE
ELECTION BALLOT AND SUSPEND HOUSE BILL No. 671 (1993) (on file with author).
58 Mike Dennison, Do Natelson's Claims Hold Up? Sometimes, GREAT FALLS TRIB.,
June 14, 1993, at 1,4.
59 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES: 1992 at 50 (1992); See also
Natelson's Numbers Flawed, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON., Oct. 21, 1993, at I.
60 Natelson Sticks by His Guns, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON., Oct. 22, 1993, at 1.
61 See MONTANANS FOR BETTER GOVERNMENT, WHY WE SHOULD VOTE ON THE IN-
COME TAX HIKE (H.B. 671), WHAT HOUSE BILL 671 WILL COST YOU, QUESTIONS AND AN-
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cepts appropriations from the initiative and referendum process, Profes-
sor Natelson took some pains to avoid saying explicitly that suspension
was a central engine in his plan to "reinvent" Montana government, a
plan which called for giving parents tax vouchers to send their children
to private schools, including the religiously affiliated, and to sharply re-
duce if not eliminate funding for higher education to be replaced by di-
rect financial support to students who would then take their vouchers to
attend the school of their choice.62
Montanans for Better Government began circulating the referendum
petitions in July. By early September, the group had gathered the signa-
tures of the five percent needed to place Referendum 112 on the ballot.63
Later that month, the group achieved the fifteen percent threshold for
suspending HB 671. As a result, on September 23, Professor Natelson
announced, "Today, I am formally announcing the suspension of House
Bill 671."64 Four days later, Secretary of State Mike Cooney informed
Governor Racicot that he had certified sufficient signatures to suspend
HB 671.65
A total of 89,663 Montanans signed the petition for Legislative Ref-
erendum 112, equivalent to 22 percent of the vote for governor in
1992.66 Further, the 15 percent threshold had been passed in 90 out of
the 100 state representative districts.67 This was a significant accom-
plishment; some knowledgeable observers, including the author, believed
that Natelson's group would have difficulty attaining the 15 percent
threshold within the six months allowed. 68 But the Natelsonites proved
themselves dedicated and organized, and utilized the help of other
groups, including the Montana chapter of the Perot organization, United
We Stand America.69
Suspension of HB 671 put the state's biennial budget out of balance,
and the Governor called the Legislature into special session to rebalance
swERs ABotrr THE PmTTION (1993) (three one page flyers issued by Montanans for Better
Government in June, 1993) (on file with author).
62 Jim Granbery, Natelson Offers More Ideas, BILLINGS GAZETrE, Nov. 9, 1993, at 1, 8.
63 David Fenner, Natelson's Odds Are Better, BILLINGS GAzEm-, Sept. 20, 1993, at 1B,
5B; Anti-tax Petition Earns Spot on Ballot, BozEMAN DAILY CHRON., Sept. 5, 1993, at 7.
64 David Fenner, Natelson Knocks Off Tax Boost, BimLirs GAzETrE, Sept. 25, 1993, at
I.
65 Tax Increase Suspended, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON., Sept. 28, 1993, at 1.
66 Bradley: Block Income Tax Suspension, BHLINGS GAzETTE, Oct. 23, 1993, at BI.
67 MONTANA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATUS OF SIGNATURES GATHERED FOR INITIATIVES:
SIGNATURES GATHERED FOR PETITION No. IR 112 (Oct. 22, 1993) (on file with author) [here-
inafter STATUS OF SIGNATURES].
68 Mike Dennison, Natelson's Petition: Not Necessarily A Done Deal, GREAT FAUS
TRIB., July 10, 1993, at 1, 8.
69 Gail Schontzler, Petition Backers Tout 2,000 County Signatures, BOZEMAN DAILY
CrRON. Aug. 30, 1993, at 3.
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it.70 Since raising replacement revenue through any new tax or increas-
ing an existing tax was not an option (these also could be easily sus-
pended), the Legislature had no choice but to cut spending by
approximately $47 million, of which 65 percent came from cuts in fund-
ing to the public schools and the state university system.71 The bulk of
the remaining 35 percent came from programs that serve the poor.
72
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARE RAISED
On October 19, 1993, Alan Nicholson, the author, and several other
plaintiffs filed suit in state district court challenging the referendum-sus-
pension process as it applied to HB 671. 73 The legal issues raised may
be summarized as follows:
" The people, in their capacity as lawmakers under the
initiative and referendum process, are bound by the
same constitutional constraints as the state legisla-
ture. Just as the state legislative majority is expressly
prohibited from acting with the clear effect of unbal-
ancing the state budget; the people are similarly
prohibited.
• The state constitution excepts "appropriations" from
the initiative and referendum process. A general rev-
enue bill explicitly designed to pay for ongoing gen-
eral fund appropriations is so interwoven with
appropriations that it must be off limits to the petition
process.
• Suspension of a legislative act by a minority of voters
constitutes rule by the minority in violation of the
"one person-one vote" rule under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the U.S. Constitution's 14th
Amendment.
" A public vote on a challenged law like HB 671 is
appropriate. But a negative public vote may permis-
sibly have only a prospective effect, since having a
retroactive effect would violate the constitutional
prohibition against unbalancing the budget.
70 STATE OF MONTANA PROCLAMATION: CALL FOR THE 53RD LEGISLATURE FOR A SPE-
CIAL SESSION (Oct. 8, 1993).
71 Mike Dennison, Session Stressed Spending Cuts, Not Reinvention, GREAT FALLS
TRIE., Dec. 21, 1993, at 1,8.
72 Id.
73 Suit Filed to Undo Suspension Of Tax, BILLINGS GAzET E, Oct. 19, 1993, at 3B.
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THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Forty-eight states have either a constitutional (35 states) or statutory
(13 states) requirement that the state operate with a balanced budget.74
Of these, 36 states require that the legislature enact a balanced budget.75
Of the 20 states permitting suspension by referendum, 15 require that the
legislature enact a balanced budget;76 of the five remaining states, the
burden rests with the governor to submit a balanced budget.77 Most im-
portantly, 39 states require that the fiscal year-end budget must be in
balance, and eighteen of the twenty states providing for the referendum-
suspension process require an end of the year balanced budget.78 Thus, it
is clear that legislatures (and sometimes governors) are limited in their
budgetary discretion. They may not purposefully submit an unbalanced
budget and, by implication, they may not take later actions which have
the effect of unbalancing the budget. To do so would be inimical to their
constitutional responsibilities.79
However, in Montana and 24 other states, laws duly enacted by
elected representatives can be suspended by a referendum petition pend-
ing a statewide election. 80 In Montana, the suspension of HB 671 had
the immediate effect of unbalancing the budget. 81 The petitioners in
Nicholson argued that the people may not do what the legislature is for-
bidden to do under the state and Federal constitutions.82 If, for example,
the legislature 1) called itself into special session (or was called into be-
ing by the governor), 2) explicitly suspended an existing tax, reduced
taxes, or increased spending without providing the revenue to pay for it,
and then 3) adjourned, the outcome would be clear - the legislature
would have acted in an unconstitutional manner and would be called to
account in the courts of the state.83
74 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: STATE EXPER-
IENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL GovERNMmr 10 (1993) [hereinafter BALANCED
BUDGET REQUIREMENTS]; Choi, supra note 12, at 336-37.
75 BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS, supra note 74, at 15; Choi, supra note 12, at 336-
37.
76 BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS, supra note 74, at 15; Choi, supra note 12, at 336-
37.
77 BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS, supra note 74, at 15; Choi, supra note 12, at 336-
37.
78 BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREmENTS, supra note 74, at 17; Choi, supra note 12, at 336-
37.
79 BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS, supra note 74, at 21.
80 Choi, supra note 12, at 336-337.
81 STATE OF MONTANA PROCLAMATION, supra note 70.
82 Calvert, supra note 54, at 24; Plaintiffs' Brief In Support of Motion For Partial Sum-
mary Judgement, supra note 16, at 15-19.
83 Plaintiffs' Brief In Support of Motion For Partial Summary Judgement, supra note 16,
at 5-6, 13, 14.
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Alternatively, imagine a system that would allow a small minority
of the legislature to convene itself by voluntary self-selection, enact laws
that unbalanced the budget, and then go home. Such action could not
withstand legal challenge. Yet, the analogous happened in Montana, and
can happen in other states by virtue of the suspension-by-referendum
process. Through this process, a minority of voters, acting in their ca-
pacity as citizen-legislators, can sign petitions which suspend a state law
and thereby unbalance the budget contrary to the constitutional require-
ments imposed on the legislature.
It is a well-established principle in constitutional law that "the Peo-
ple" are bound by the same constitutional limitations imposed on the
legislature. 84 Consider the following example: Suppose that, by referen-
dum, the people enacted a law denying civil rights to homosexuals.
Courts would view such a group-defined denial as a clear violation of the
14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 85 In Hunter v. Erickson,
the U.S. Supreme Court declared, "[T]he sovereignty of the people is
itself subject to those constitutional limitations which have been duly
adopted and remained unrepealed. '' 86 Additionally, in Kennedy Whole-
sale v. State Board of Equalization, California's high court said,
"[N]either the legislator nor the voters may enact a law of the nature that
exceeds a limitation on the state's lawmaking power, such as the right of
free speech. '87
Nonetheless, as Professor Eule has pointed out, state constitutions
which provide for direct democratic devices proceed from a perspective
different from that of the Federal Constitution.88 In those state constitu-
tions which say "the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative
and referendum," there is an implication that "the People" have greater
legislative authority than the legislators themselves. 89 But Eule has con-
cluded on this point that "state courts generally articulate the view that
state constitutional challenges to voter legislation are subject to the same
standard of review applied to laws passed in the ordinary manner."90
Therefore, just as the legislature may not unbalance the state's budget,
neither may the people.
As noted above, most states providing for the suspension of a con-
tested legislative enactment also except certain kinds of laws from this
process. The most common exemptions are legislatively-declared
84 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 54, 82-83; MAGLEBY, supra note 9, at 49-51.
85 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
86 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969).
87 806 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Cal. 1991).
88 Julian Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1545-48
(1990).
89 Id. at 1545 (citing CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1).
90 Id. at 1548.
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"emergency" laws and appropriations. 91 Montana and thirteen other
states except appropriations from referendum petition. 92 Ironically, only
two states (California and Ohio) fence off revenue measures as well.93
Thus, at least twelve states are in the position of having their general
funding decisions modified by subsequent petition drives which can sus-
pend the revenues upon which those appropriations depend.
Consequently, anti-tax and "government-is-bad" zealots have an op-
portunity to cut the size of government by denying it expected revenues.
Legislatures faced with the suspension of expected income and an unbal-
anced budget may be called into a special session to fix the problem.
They will have three options with which to proceed:
* Replace the challenged revenue measure with another
one; this outcome is highly unlikely given the polit-
ical realities.
* Re-enact the challenged revenue measure in amended
version specifying that it is designed to pay for spe-
cific general fund appropriations; again, political
problems exist.
* Cut appropriations to rebalance the budget; this is the
most likely choice for legislators to make.
Given the actual effect of suspension of a major tax designed to pay
for general fund appropriations (an unbalanced budget), and given polit-
ical reality (legislators dare not defy the "will" of the voters by reimpos-
ing the revenue), the practical effect of tax suspension is to change
appropriations by the referendum process which is prohibited by the con-
stitutions of 14 states, including Montana. 94 Plaintiffs in Nicholson v.
Cooney95 raised this issue by arguing that:
The Constitution excepts appropriations measures from
the popular initiative and referendum process. Yet the
current referendum measure, by eviscerating the general
revenue act upon which numerous appropriations were
based, did just that - it inevitably resulted in a modifi-
cation of appropriations - an area off limits to the pop-
ular referendum under Article II, § 5 of the Montana
Constitution.96
91 BoTr, supra note 11, at 282.
92 Id.
93 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a); OHIo CONST. art. 1, § l(d).
94 Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 16, at
15-27.
95 877 P.2d 486, 491 (Mont. 1994).
96 Appellants' Opening Brief at 26-27, Nicholson v. Cooney, 877 P.2d 486 (Mont. 1994)
(No. 93-657).
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Since there is no Montana case directly on point regarding whether
a general revenue bill is off limits if designed to pay for general fund
appropriations, plaintiff-appellants cited to cases from Maryland and
Michigan.97 In Dorsey v. Petrott, Maryland's highest court said:
[R]evenue measures to raise the public funds to pay for
appropriations of the Budget Bill are excepted from the
operation of the Referendum Amendment, although the
revenue thus procured is disbursed by the Treasury
through the provisions of the Budget without any ex-
press authorization in the money bill for its
disbursement.98
The Maryland example is analogous to the situation involving the
Montana legislature's income tax bill suspended by Referendum 112.
While the word "appropriation" is not mentioned, the plain purpose of
the bill was to pay for general fund appropriations and provide for a
balanced budget.99 To further bolster their argument, the plaintiffs cited
the following language from the Legislative Fiscal Analyst's office in
their brief before the Montana Supreme Court:
The 1993 Legislature faced an extremely difficult finan-
cial situation. Four of the major accounts in state gov-
ernment were projected to have combined deficits of
280.3 million dollars by the end of the 1995 biennium.
Through budget reductions, revenue increases, and reve-
nue estimate revisions, the legislature addressed the pro-
jected deficits in all four accounts and adopted a
balanced budget for the 1995 biennium.' 00
Plaintiffs told the Montana Supreme Court:
The 1993 legislature passed appropriations bills and HB
671 for a singular purpose - to provide for state gov-
ernment while balancing the budget. Thus, like the acts
considered [in Maryland and Michigan], those acts must
be read in par! materia, and revenue bills which fund
current appropriations, like H. B. 671, must be exempt
from the revenue process. Doing so prevents abuse of
the referendum process by those who wish to use the
process indirectly to cut appropriations, and prevents use
97 Id. at 37-40.
98 Id. at 38 (quoting Dorsey v. Petrott, 13 A.2d 630 (Md. 1940)).
99 Id. at 33, 41.
100 Id. at 6, n.10.
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of the referendum process to force an unconstitutional
unbalancing of the State's budget. 10'
The plaintiffs' final state constitutional argument was that suspen-
sion of the state income tax bill by the petition process violated Article
VIII, § 2 of the Montana Constitution which states: "The power to tax
shall never be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away."'01 2 Articles
III, Sec. 5 (2) and VI, § 2 are in apparent contradiction since both men-
tion "suspension."' 0 3 Thus Nicholson and other petitioners asserted:
That term [suspend] obviously must be interpreted to
mean the same thing in both of those articles. Thus,
while the Montana referendum provides generally for
suspension of legislation, tax measures may not be sus-
pended. As noted above, there are good reasons for this
exception. The ability of a small minority of voters to
suspend a tax measure would seriously handicap govern-
ment's ability to provide for general operations and
could, as here, result in a substantial budget deficit.104
THE EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT
The central argument in Nicholson involves the 14th Amendment
and its relevance to the referendum-suspension process in the twenty
states that permit it - especially those that fence off appropriation bills,
but not revenue bills from a public petition, suspension, and general elec-
tion vote. In Montana, to qualify for a general vote, the referendum peti-
tion must gather signatures equivalent to five percent of the vote for
governor in the last election and get them in at least one third of the state
house districts. 10 5 But due to what may have been an oversight on the
part of state constitution framers, there is no statewide percentage re-
quirement to suspend a contested law.
Thus, those who object to a law need only gather the requisite
number of signatures (15 percent of the vote for governor in each of 51
districts) to successfully suspend it. 106 And since the total vote for gover-
nor varied considerably in aggregate across the 100 house districts, the
15 percent threshold varied accordingly, ranging from 378 to 1,030 sig-
natures across the 100 house districts. 10 7 According to estimates made
by the Secretary of State's office, a well-organized petition drive that
101 Id. at 41.
102 Id. at 42-43.
103 l at 43.
104 d (emphasis in orginal).
105 MONT. CONST. art. III, §§ 5(1-2).
106 lad
107 STATUS OF SIGNATURES, supra note 67.
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concentrated on the 51 house districts with the smallest aggregate vote
for governor could qualify suspension with only 25,914 valid signatures,
equivalent to only 6.4 percent of the statewide vote for governor in the
1992 election.10 8
Further, the state constitution provides no remedy in the process for
those who wish to object. There is no provision for a counterpetition
drive to prevent suspension by a small minority of voters, and thus appel-
lants argued that:
There is no practical remedy available to the majority to
undo the damage of the suspension. Once the petitioners
present 15 percent of the signatures from the requisite 51
districts, suspension is automatic and immediate. No
counter-suspension petition is possible, be it by an
equivalent 15 percent minority or even by a majority of
voters. They indeed become the "silent majority," com-
pletely disenfranchised in this process.10 9
The practical disenfranchisement of the majority under Montana's
suspension-by-referendum petition process is the central and most signif-
icant constitutional issue raised Nicholson. In this case, Alan Nicholson
and the other appellants asked the Montana Supreme Court to break new
constitutional ground by applying the 14th Amendment's "one person-
one vote" rule to the suspension process of a state law by a minority of
voters. 110 The appellants also asked the Court to apply the strictest scru-
tiny to the state's defense in demanding that the state show a compelling
interest in justifying its defense of minority rule.11" '
In 1963 and 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a series of landmark
decisions, interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend-
ment as applying to the districting and apportionment of electoral dis-
tricts.112 In the leading case, Gray v. Sanders,113 the Court struck down
a Georgia electoral law which gave disproportionate weight to rural
counties in the state's primary election. Reasoning that Equal Protection
implies equality in the value of the votes of all the state's citizens, the
Court asked:
How then can one person be given twice or ten times the
voting power of another person in a statewide election
108 As Few As 25,914 Signatures Could Suspend Tax, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON., May 25,
1993, at 1.
109 Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 96, at 21-22.
110 Id. at 17-24.
111 Appellants' Reply Brief, Nicholson v. Cooney, 877 P.2d 486 (Mont. 1994) (No. 93-
657).
112 Boar, supra note 11, at 187-88.
113 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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merely because he lives in a rural area or because he
lives in the smallest rural county? Once the geographic
unit for which a representative is to be chosen is desig-
nated, all who participate in the election are to have an
equal vote - whatever their race, whatever their sex,
whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and
wherever their home may be in that geographical unit.
This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The concept of 'we the people'
under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of
voters but equality among those who meet the basic
qualifications.' 14
The Court stated that "state power" may not be "used as an instru-
ment for circumventing a federally-protected right" and concluded that
"[tlhe conception of political equality from the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth,
and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing - one person,
one vote."1 5 In Wesberry v. Sanders,116 the majority opinion clearly
stated that the right claimed was fundamental saying, "No right is more
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of
those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined." 17
In Reynolds v. Sims, 18 the Court addressed a common state practice
of granting counties equality of representation in the upper house, and
failing to base lower chambers completely upon the principle of repre-
sentation of people, either by simple failure to redistrict after the census
or by giving each county a minimum of one representative. The former
tends to give disproportionate voting power to rural voters while the later
results in additional representatives for the more populous counties. In
both instances, the result undervalued the votes of urban dwellers and
overvalued those living in rural areas.119 In this Alabama case, the Court
noted that the population variances from largest to smallest counties
ranged from sixteen-to-one, in the state house, to forty-to-one in the state
senate.120 For the Court, these facts meant patent violation of the princi-
ple of "one person-one vote," saying, "[T]he right of suffrage can be
114 Id at 379-80.
115 Id. at 381 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960)).
116 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
117 Id. at 17.
118 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
119 Id. at 545-48.
120 Id. at 545.
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denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just
as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise,"121 and that "[w]eighting the votes of citizens differently, by
any method or means, merely because of where they happen to reside,
hardly seems justifiable."'' 22
The key principle in Reynolds is that purposive institutional ar-
rangements which ensure rule by a minority clearly violate the equal pro-
tection requirements of the 14th Amendment. 123 One person-one vote,
rather than being an abstract ideal of equality which governments must
honor, is a practical political requirement for a functioning democracy. 124
The Court asserted:
Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded on represen-
tative government, it would seem reasonable that a ma-
jority of the people of a state could elect a majority of
that State's legislators. To conclude differently, and to
sanction minority control of state legislative bodies,
would appear to deny majority rights in a way that far
surpasses any possible denial of minority rights that
might otherwise be thought to result. 125
The Court has not been hesitant in extending the reasoning estab-
lished in Reynolds to other elections. In Hadley v. Junior College Dis-
trict, Justice Black, writing for the majority opinion, reasoned:
If one person's vote is given less weight through unequal
apportionment, his right to equal voting participation is
impaired just as much when he votes for a school board
member as when he votes for a state legislator. . . . It
might be suggested that equal apportionment is required
only in 'important' elections, but good judgment and
common sense tell us that what might be a vital election
to one voter might well be a routine one to another.126
Finally, Justice Stevens, concurring in an opinion requiring that
New Jersey use every reasonable means to create districts equal in popu-
lation, summarized the implications of equal protection and voting equal-
ity this way:
121 377 U.S. at 555.
122 Id. at 563.
123 Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note I 11, at 7 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at
565).
124 Id. at 7-8.
125 377 U.S. at 565.
126 397 U.S. 50, 55 (1970).
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The Equal Protection Clause requires every state to gov-
ern impartially. When a State adopts rules governing its
election machinery or defining its electoral boundaries,
those rules must serve the interests of the entire commu-
nity. If they serve no purpose other than to favor one
segment - whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic,
or political - that may occupy a position of strength at a
particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically
weak segment of the community, they violate the consti-
tutional guarantee of equal protection. 127
The key assertion made by appellants in Nicholson is that the major-
ity has been effectively disenfranchised by the state constitutional lan-
guage which permits a small minority of voters to suspend a law they
object to and whose suspension attempt faces no countervailing possibil-
ity of a counter-petition. What Article III, § 5, cl. 2 does is give greater
weight to those who sign the petition - the minority - than to those
who do not. What is key here is that suspension is a legislative act, as
fully effective as if the legislature had itself met and suspended the con-
tested law, but the difference is that the legislature does in a formal sense
represent the majority, at least in two ways: first, requiring the legislature
to decide by majority, and second, requiring, following the principle es-
tablished in Reynolds, that legislative majorities at least reasonably repre-
sent population majorities.
Thus, the discriminatory effect inherent in the suspension process is
that greater weight is given to those who vote "no" by signing a petition
compared to those who might vote "yes" were they to have the opportu-
nity to do so (which they do not). It does no good to say that the "yes"
voters will have their chance at a later date, in this instance fourteen
months after the fact.
In Montana, the damage from cuts in appropriations had already
occurred, making the actual vote on HB 671 on November 8, 1994 a
dead letter.' 28 Budgets for education and social services were cut, and in
a result that must have been particularly painful given the relatively
favorable support that R1 12 enjoyed in rural areas, most drivers' license
exam stations in rural counties were closed as well. 129
Those challenging the suspension provisions of the Montana Consti-
tution reiterated again and again that the act of signing a petition to sus-
pend a legislative act is a "vote" because if the requisite threshold is
127 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983).
128 Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 96, at 22-24.
129 David Fenner, Bill Would Cut License Stations, BILLINGS GAzEmrr, Dec. 10, 1993, at
B6; Charles Johnson, Session Ends With No Tax Relief, GREAT FALLs TRiB., Dec. 19, 1994, at
1, 13.
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achieved the "vote" suspends the act.130 Since the right to vote is
deemed to be a fundamental right,131 any alleged undermining of that
right by state action warrants strict scrutiny in which the government
must show a "compelling interest" - in this case, that those opposing an
enacted law be given greater weight than those who either support the
law or those who may be neutral toward it.132 In short, just as race,
gender, and geographic locale are suspect classifications, a voting
scheme that gives greater weight to the "votes" of those who sign a peti-
tion (by definition a small numeric minority) and lesser weight to the
majority who have not, would appear to be of dubious constitutionality
under the one person-one vote principle.
Yet the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to depart from the principle
of "one person-one vote" in the troubling case of Gordon v. Lance.133 In
this case, the Court upheld as not violative of the Equal Protection
Clause a West Virginia requirement that an extraordinary majority vote
is required to pass local bond issues. 134 In this case, a favorable majority
of 51.55 percent had been obtained, but under the rule requiring an ex-
traordinary majority of 60 percent, the bond issue failed. 35 Citing the
fact that extraordinary majority requirements are imbedded in the U.S.
Constitution to achieve certain kinds of enactments, e.g., to propose and
ratify amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Court in Gordon rea-
soned that a supermajority threshold, because it was not intended to dis-
criminate against any particular race, class, or gender, did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. 136
But, in Gordon, the Court erred. There is an identifiable class of
citizens that is disadvantaged. The majority of voters who voted "yes"
had been disenfranchised because their votes were given less weight than
those who had voted "no."' 137 Perhaps in recognizing that, in this case,
they had gone out on a limb in relation to the one person-one vote princi-
ple, the Court stated, "We intimate no view on the constitutionality of a
provision requiring unanimity or giving a veto power to a very small
group. Nor do we decide whether a State may, consistently with the
Constitution, require extraordinary majorities for the election of public
officers."1 38
130 Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 96, at 17-24.
131 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
132 Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 111, at 12 (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67 (1966)).
133 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
134 Id. at 7.
135 Id. at 3.
136 Id. at 5-7.
137 William L. Bruning, Comment, Extraordinary Majority Requirements in Municipal
Bond Elections, 19 KAN. L. REV. 263, 273-74 (1971).
138 403 U.S. at 8, n. 6.
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In the Montana case, the suspension language of the constitution
gives "veto power to a very small group."' 39 The small group may be
motivated by a wish to cut taxes or to cut government; or it may be
motivated by other reasons, e.g., to suspend a law protecting homosexu-
als against discrimination, to attack, the sovereign authority claimed by
Native American tribes, or to broaden the grounds under which a woman
might elect to chose an abortion. In theory, the motivation behind the
veto does not matter; in practice, it should. A small minority can hold
the state's financial health in peril or deny civil rights protections to spe-
cific and vulnerable segments of the population because it has the author-
ity to suspend any new tax or tax increase enacted.
THE STATE ANSWERS
On March 24, 1994, the State responded to the appellants' brief, as
required by the state constitution. 40 Their response may be briefly sum-
marized as follows. First, while acknowledging that the budget was im-
balanced by the suspension of -B 671, the State argued that the
legislature has the duty to adjust the budget to correct for "unanticipated
revenue declines" brought on by "factors which cannot always be fore-
seen with even a reasonable degree of accuracy."' 41
Second, the State argued at great length that since HB 671 did not
mention "appropriation," it was therefore not excepted as an "appropria-
tion" measure under the Montana Constitution.' 42 Rather it was "a pure
revenue-raising measure" because "it contains no provision for
expenditures."' 43
Third, counsel for the respondent Cooney argued that since "the
people," acting through their legislative capacity, may do all that the leg-
islature can do, the voters (in this instance a small group of them) may,
like the legislature, suspend or repeal a tax. Furthermore, in so doing,
the tax power of the state has not been suspended or surrendered
away. 144 Rather, it is the case that a particular tax measure has been
temporarily suspended pending a final vote. Again, the failure to address
the central issue of whether the people may do what the legislature may
not, unbalance the budget, was not explicitly addressed in the State's
reply.
139 Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 111, at 11.
140 Brief of Respondent and Cross Appellant Mike Cooney, Nicholson v. Cooney, 877
P.2d 486 (Mont. 1994) (No. 93-657).
141 Id at 24-25 (quoting State ex reL Tipton v. Erickson, 19 P.2d 227, 230 (Mont. 1933)).
142 Id. at 8-12.
143 Id. at 14.
144 Id. at 19-25.
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Finally, in response to the 14th Amendment arguments raised by
plaintiff-appellants, the State's response was limited to two counter-as-
sertions. First, "one person-one vote" only applies to the districting and
apportionment of legislative seats with the purpose of ensuring that each
person's vote does not weigh more or less than any other voter's, and
that the suspension process did not cause "disparate treatment of differ-
ent classes of people." 145 Missing from the State's reply was acknowl-
edgment that "one person-one vote" was not the end of Equal Protection,
but rather the means to achieve a result - that a majority of people can
elect and be represented by a majority of legislators. And, as asserted
above, the suspension language of the Montana Constitution can only
lead to disparate treatment in which "no" votes are given greater weight
than "yes" votes.
In reply, appellants addressed all objections raised by the state. In
particular, appellants devoted considerable attention to the Equal Protec-
tion issues raised in the case. Arguing from Reynolds, Nicholson as-
serted that denial of equal voting power through the suspension device
warranted "strict scrutiny" because the right to vote was fundamental.146
Thus, the State had to establish a compelling interest justifying minority
rule, which it could not do:
In this case, there is no important or overriding state in-
terest in allowing a small minority of voters to undo leg-
islation passed by representatives elected by the
majority. The interest of the State in protecting the ref-
erendum power does not require allowing such minority
control of the fate of legislation duly passed by the ma-
jority via that majority's elected representatives.
Allowing such tyranny by the minority does not even meet the rational
basis test. The right of referendum may be exercised rationally since it
provides for a vote by all of the electorate on a particular bill. There is
no rational reason that a bill must be suspended pending that vote. The
rational approach, instead, would be to allow the legislature to pass bills
and have those bills remain unaffected until a referendum vote, in which
all the electorate has a chance to participate, repeals or upholds them. 147
THE DECISION OF THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT
On June 30, 1994, the Montana Supreme Court voted 5 to 2 in favor
of the State, upholding the State's referendum-suspension processes in
145 Id. at 26-29.
146 Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 111, at 12-13.
147 Id. at 12-13.
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all particulars. 148 The result was not surprising. Oral argument had been
held in May in the city of Billings in a large auditorium to allow local
schoolchildren to watch the majesty of the judicial process.1 49 There, as
the attorneys' arguments echoed in the high-ceilinged chamber and as
many junior high children tried to listen politely in what was probably
total bafflement (much to their credit), the line of questions from the
Bench clearly signaled that no new legal ground was to be broken by the
court majority that day or in their subsequent written opinion.150
First, the Court majority, speaking through Justice John Harrison,
ruled that the balanced budget requirement does not place limits on the
voters:
Article VIII, § 9 places a restriction on the legislature,
not on the people.... The reaction of the executive and
legislative branches in calling a special session of the
legislature to deal with an unforeseen decline in revenue
(or increases in expenditures) might have been prompted
by a number of causes. Calling a special session to rec-
oncile expenditures with anticipated revenues was en-
tirely proper. The purpose of the balanced budget
provision is therefore fully compatible the operation of
the referendum process.' 51
Second, the Court agreed with the State that HB 671 was not an
"appropriation" measure and therefore was not excepted from the initia-
tive and referendum process because the tax bill did not explicitly say
that the anticipated revenue was tied to general fund expenditures.1 52
Regarding the contention that a suspension constituted the State's
suspension and surrender of its taxing power, the Court majority replied:
Plaintiffs fail to distinguish between a tax measure and
the taxing power. There has been no surrender or sus-
pension of the taxing power; Referendum 112 has
merely resulted in the suspension and referral of one
measure by which the taxing power is exercised.... The
State of Montana is still collecting taxes, and will con-
tinue to do so, under Chapter 634 [House Bill 671] if the
voters approve it, or under the law in existence prior to
148 Nicholson v. Cooney, 877 P.2d 486 (Mont. 1994).
149 Jim Granbery, Did The Petition Drive Trample Rights?, BILLINGS GAZETrE, May 14,
1994, at 1, 14.
150 The writer's observation at the Supreme Court hearing is that the justices for the most
part were not interested in exploring new ground, especially as it related to the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
151 877 P.2d at 491 (footnote omitted).
152 Id.
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the legislative enactment of Chapter 634 if the voters re-
ject it.153
Finally, in its response the Equal Protection issue, the Court es-
poused the narrow view offered by the State that "one person-one vote"
only applies to reapportionment cases and cases involving the segregat-
ing of a "class or segment of the population."' 154 The court continued,
"Here, the majority, through a constitutional referendum provision, has
affirmatively granted certain powers to a minority. The majority retains
the power to eliminate the referendum provision from the Montana Con-
stitution or to amend it to increase the numbers of signatures needed to
put a referendum on the ballot."155
This interpretation of Equal Protection by the Court majority was
achieved in the body of two type-written pages of text, citing only two
cases, Reynolds and Gordon, in justifying their conclusion that the ma-
jority had "affirmatively granted certain powers to a minority." 156 The
assertion that the one person-one vote rule is a means toward ensuring
majority government was simply not addressed. Rather, it was side-
stepped in favor of a justification offered independently of both the rele-
vant case law and the historic context.
For example, it notes that there is virtually nothing in the minutes of
the state constitutional convention that speaks to the motives of the dele-
gates who approved the referendum-suspension language in the 1972
Montana Constitution. And of course, it would be absurd to imply that
"the majority," in approving the new Constitution, had in a rational and
informed way given its authority to the minority identified in the referen-
dum process.
In his dissent in Nicholson, Associate Justice Terry Trieweiler
(joined by Justice Hunter) criticized the majority for misreading the re-
quirements of Reynolds. Trieweiller felt Reynolds was clearly about en-
suring representative government by majority rule and that the one
person-one vote principle was the means to that end. 157 Most impor-
tantly, Justice Trieweiler recognized that the right of a minority to sus-
pend a law ignores that principle:
[T]he fact that both Montana's House of Representatives
and Senate are apportioned on a population basis is of no
benefit to the majority who elected them if a minority
can routinely and effectively veto their efforts in a pro-
cess which provides no opportunity for those who are
153 Id. at 492.
154 Id. at 489-90.
155 Id. at 490.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 496.
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opposed to the proposed referendum to cast their vote in
opposition.' 58
He observed, "The argument that those who oppose Referendum
112 will ultimately have an opportunity to express their view on Novem-
ber 8, 1994, is of little constitutional significance, considering the irre-
versible suspension of the majority's decision for the intervening 14
months." 159 Trieweiler also agreed with appellants that R. 112 had un-
balanced the budget, that the voters could not do that, and that the in-
come tax bill in dispute was so intertwined with general fund
appropriations that suspension was tantamount to a cut in appropriations
excepted from the initiative and referendum process.1 60 In October, the
U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, and Nicholson's career as a vehi-
cle for challenging minority rule by the suspension process ended. 16'
DISCUSSION
The initiative and referendum processes epitomize the populist tra-
dition in American democratic thought and practice. They assume that
the majority is capable and willing to make significant policy determina-
tions on its own, and assume also that government, even well-established
representative government, is corruptible and often is corrupt. These de-
vices, products of late 19th and early 20th century zeal for reform, were
based upon some real fears.' 62 It appeared that state governments, espe-
cially the state legislatures, were often controlled by well-heeled special
interests.163 So, it was reasoned, the citizens needed a method to get
around unresponsive institutions.164 In short, the initiative and referen-
dum processes envision representative goveriment subject to direct
checks by the people. Voicing this populist theory of governance, Sena-
tor James Abourzek (D-SD), in arguing for an amendment to the U.S.
Constitution to allow for a national initiative process, said:
158 Id. at 496-98.
159 Id. 496.
160 Id. at 494-96, 498-99.
161 The grounds cited by the Assistant Clerk of the Court were that appellants had failed
to file in a timely manner. The issue was narrowly technical. Attorneys for Nicholson used
the Montana filing deadline requirements, which were slightly different than those used by the
U.S. Supreme Court; the appeal was formally filed on October 12, well within the Montana
standard, but was 14 days past the deadline by U.S. Supreme Court standards. An appeal of
this rejection was then filed, but to no avail. By his own admission, the lead attorney for
appellants had erred. But the probability of the Court accepting jurisdiction was, in any case,
very small. Given the crowded docket, the absence of conflicting case law on the question,
and the fact that the state legislature had cut the spending (thus raising the issue of mootness),
the chances of the Court granting certiorari had been small to being with.
162 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 68-70.
163 MAGLEBY, supra note 9, at 20-25.
164 Id.
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I believe that true democracy must rest on the fundamen-
tal belief that the people are sufficiently intelligent, suffi-
ciently discerning, and sufficiently capable to govern
themselves. In the representative form of government
we have today, we trust the judgment of the people to
elect our leaders. Throughout our history this Nation has
been well served by the judgment of the people. If we
accept the premise that the people can choose between
good and bad leaders, I think we must accept the notion
that the people can choose between good and bad
laws. 165
In 1911, Congressman John Raker (D-CA), an early supporter of the
direct democratic process, succinctly summarized the case for initiatives,
referenda, and recall elections:
The Initiative, Referendum, and Recall are closely con-
nected parts of the same political theory. The people
elect representatives; if these representatives don't carry
out the will of the people, then the people initiate legisla-
tion. If their representatives transgress the will of the
people, then the people, through the referendum, repeal
the laws which their representatives have made .... If
[they] do violence to the will of the people as expressed
in their laws, then the people reserve the right to recall
the interpreters as well as the makers or executives of
law. . . . This political theory constitutes democracy in
action. 166
Most commentary on direct democratic devices has focused on the
initiative rather than the popular referendum; but the problems identified
with the initiative apply with even more force to the popular referendum,
especially where the contested law has been suspended pending a popu-
lar vote. 167
First, voters often do not have the knowledge and motivation to sort
out the often highly detailed ballot questions presented to them. 16 8
David Magleby, in a groundbreaking study, provides extensive evidence
that many voters, confused and intimidated by the length and complexity
of initiative propositions, do not take the time to understand these pro-
165 Voter Initiative Constitutional Amendment, 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1977) [here-
inafter Voter Initiative Constitutional Amend.].
166 Id. at 246.
167 Id. at 59-65; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 91-95.
168 MAGLEBY, supra note 9, at 127-44.
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positions on which they vote.169 Magleby states that this is especially the
case for less-educated voters:
Generally, only the better educated can understand the
issues, endure the length and complexity of the wording,
and cast knowledgeable votes. The universalist ethic of
the early and modem advocates of direct legislation is
not supported in practice. Less educated voters are less
likely to participate on propositions, and the reasons for
their lower levels of participation are now partially ap-
parent: they are confused by the propositions and unable
to cope with the task of informing themselves about
them.170
Consider, for example, the travail of California's voters where the
initiative, as a source of major legislative action, has been well-estab-
lished. In the 1990 general election, California voters faced 28 separate
initiatives and legislative referendums.' 71 The voter information pam-
phlet filled two volumes totaling 221 pages. 172 By comparison, Califor-
nians got lucky in 1992 when there were only 13 ballot issues, filling 94
pages of the official voter information pamphlet.' 73 Not surprisingly, ev-
idence suggests that only a minority of voters have very specific and
accurate information about the issues they are called upon to decide.174
Symptomatic of this generalization, witness Proposition 187 in Cali-
fornia. One of the most controversial voter initiatives in recent years,
"Prop 187" seeks to cut off most state government services to illegal
immigrants and their children and requires service providers like medical
personnel and school teachers to check on the citizenship of their cli-
ents.175 Despite the most intense, and often very critical, publicity di-
rected at Prop 187, 44 percent of registered voters, in September 1994,
could voice no opinion on Prop 187 after its title was read to them. 176
But when a brief description was read, the percentage unable to voice an
opinion declined to 9 percent.1 77 By mid-October these numbers had
169 Id
170 Id at 144.
171 SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 6,
1990); SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA SUPPLEMENTAL BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL
ELECTION (Nov. 6, 1990).
172 Id.
173 SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 3,
1992).
174 MAGLEBY, supra note 9, at 139-44.
175 Cathleen Decker, Voters Back Service Cuts For Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, May
29, 1994, at 1.
176 Paul Feldman, 62 Percent Would Bar Services to Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 1994, at 1.
177 Id.
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declined to 30 percent (label only) and 8 percent (label + description),
respectively. 178 Prop 187 passed easily in November only to be quickly
blocked by a Federal district court. 179
Further, ballot questions are often "hot button" issues in which the
fears and ignorance of voters can be easily exploited. Like Proposition
187, proposals to cut taxes, prevent new taxes, or reduce government
spending have similar powers of persuasion since they appeal to the pas-
sion and perception rather than the intellect, and they are popular.1 80 Be-
tween 1978 and 1992, 399 statewide initiatives appeared on the ballot,
and of these, better than one in four (26 percent) concerned taxes. 181 But
at least in the initiative process, there is the opportunity for extensive
public debate prior to the vote. 182
Not so for the popular referendum. In the popular referendum, the
contested law is already effectively voided prior to any receipt of accu-
rate information by the voters, and it is nullified long before the actual
vote is taken. 183 Rather, in ways only determined by a petition's sup-
porters, signatures are gathered here and there without a statewide public
discourse about the attempt to repeal and its implications. 8 4 In short, the
initiative admits the possibility of a public debate, while the suspension
of an enacted law by referendum petition does not.
Secondly, the initiative and referendum often oversimplify the
choices that voters are obliged to make. The initiative, and especially the
petition for a referendum, are not deliberative processes. The observa-
tions made by Magleby for the initiative apply to the issues like Referen-
dum 112 with even greater force:
In direct legislation the voter is only partially a legisla-
tor. The voter is not party to the drafting and compro-
mising process and can play no part in the determination
of the policy choice he will confront. Thus, voters are
faced with statutes that they did not help to write and
that they must affirm or reject in toto. Direct legislation
does not face the procedural constraints of the legislative
process: hearings, amendments, markup, scheduling,
178 Paul Feldman, Anti-Illegal Immigration Prop. 187 Keeps 2-to-1 Edge, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 1994, at Al.
179 Maura Dolan, Parts Of Prop. 187 May Be Blocked 2 Or More Years, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1994, at 1; Paul Feldman & Patrick McDonnell, U.S. Judge Blocks Most Sections of
Prop. 187, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1994, at 1.
180 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 93-95.
181 Magleby, supra note 13, at 238.
182 As noted above, deadlines for sucessfully filing referendum petitions are much shorter
than those to qualify an initiative. Choi, supra note 12, at 331-32, 337.
183 Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 16, at
5, 10-11.
184 See MAGLEBY, supra note 9, at 184-85.
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floor debate, and conference. In contrast, rarely do the
sponsors of an initiative circulate their bill prior to the
petition phase - and once this phase begins, the lan-
guage cannot be changed. The process of direct legisla-
tion is not built upon the principle of compromise and
accommodation but instead forces an all-or-nothing pol-
icy decision on the question as formulated by the spon-
sors alone.18 5
The "all or nothing" quality of public choice on ballot questions
necessarily minimizes the give-and-take of open and extensive debate,
debate which can reveal not only flaws in the initial proposal, but which
can also encourage an atmosphere in which discussion, compromise, and
accommodation of views can happen.18 6 Eule says of ballot
propositions:
Public debate is infrequent. Exposure to minority per-
spectives occurs accidentally if at all. Voters may be
confused and overwhelmed by the issues before
them .... Most important, voters register their deci-
sions in the privacy of the voting booth. They are unac-
countable to others for their preferences and their biases.
Their individual commitment to a consistent and fair
course of conduct can be neither measured nor
questioned.187
This lack of accountability is especially pronounced in a referendum
petition process. While the polling place may lend an aura of importance
and hence responsibility to all those who take part, the slapdash, shotgun
randomization of signature gathering does not.188 Rather, the unsuspect-
ing citizen may be accosted outside the local convenience store and see a
clipboard thrust forward with a request to "sign" to "cut taxes" or "re-
duce government." Rarely does a petition signer, already interrupted on
the way to more immediate business, bother to read, analyze, think about
the significance of the issue. Further, if the citizen hesitates, the petition
gatherer then asserts (as many have said to me) that the citizen should
sign just "to get the issue on the ballot" so that "the people" can decide,
presumably after a full and complete airing of the costs and benefits of
the proposal in the "marketplace of ideas."' 8 9 Studies have shown that
most initiative petition signers do not read what they sign, but simply
185 Id. at 184.
186 Id. at 186-88.
187 Eule, supra note 88, at 1555-56.
188 See the critical comments of State Representative Dave Gilbert (R-Glendive) in
Charles Johnson, Petition Opponents Take Action, BILLINGS GAT_ rrE, Sept. 25, 1993, at 1.
189 MAGLEBY, supra note 9, at 62-63.
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accept the characterization given by the signature gatherers. 190 To be
sure, with the initiative some subsequent public debate will ensue prior to
a public vote, but as we must stress, there is no deliberation in the refer-
endum-suspension process. The only loud "voice" is that of the army of
gatherers.
Referendum 112 was a classic case in point. R. 112 proponents, for
the most part, defined the issue as one of lowering taxes and cutting the
size and cost of government. 191 Lost in the one-sided selling was objec-
tive evidence about whose taxes would go up or down if House Bill 671
were suspended, and where cuts in appropriations would be made should
the petition drive be successful. 192 Most signers of the petition could not
have known that, of the 46 programs in the state general fund, five of
them (social services, education, corrections, human services, and family
services) accounted for $907 million out of $1.15 in general fund appro-
priations (78.1 percent of the total). 193 Nor could they have known in the
summer of 1993, unless they very carefully read some isolated article in
a daily newspaper, that initial estimates made by the Montana Depart-
ment of Revenue showed that HB 671 would decrease state income tax
obligations for 44 percent of Montana households, increase for 39 per-
cent, and not significantly change the tax obligations for the rest.194
What they saw instead was almost all elected officials of both par-
ties running for cover in hope that, by saying nothing, R. 112 would die
quietly.195 Symptomatic of the timidity on the part of elected officials,
Governor Marc Racicot, a moderate Republican, announced that he
would not sign the petition nor did he support it; however, he made no
attempt to use the "bully pulpit" of his office to denounce the petition
and he tolerated the open public support given to R. 112 by his budget
director, Dave Lewis. 196
Thirdly, the early advocates of initiative and referendum would be
surprised and shocked to discover that today direct legislation is often
190 See id.
191 See MONTANANS FOR A BETTER GOVERNMENT, supra note 61, and accompanying text.
192 Compare MONTANANS FOR BETTER GOVERNMENT, supra note 61, with Mike Denni-
son, Impacts Vary Widely Under Montana's New Income Tax, GREAT FALLS TRIB., July 19,
1993, at 1, 6.
193 See OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE FISCAL ANALYST, POTENTIAL SUSPENSION OF HOUSE
BILL 671 (1993).
194 Jim Elliott (Montana State Representative), HB671 - Montana's New Income Tax,
June 14, 1993 (press release on file with author).
195 An exception was Superintendent of Public Instruction Nancy Keenan. See Keenan,
This Public Official Will Not Be Silenced, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON., Aug. 19, 1993, at 4; State
Senator Tom Towe, Don't Sign Natelson's Petition, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON., June 27, 1993,
at 5.
196 Charles Johnson, Racicot Reveals Stance on Petition, BILLINGs GAZrTE, Aug. 13,
1993, at 1; Mike Dennison, Budget Chiefs Right To Sign Petition Defended, GREAT FALLS
TRIB., July 15, 1993, at 1.
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initiated by well-organized and well-heeled economic interests. In Cali-
fornia, for example, the initiative process has created a multimillion dol-
lar mini-industry of professional consulting firms who will gather the
necessary signatures for a handsome fee and help create propaganda to
sell your idea.1 97 Indeed, in a mass market like California, with its heavy
reliance on television as a medium of political communication, multimil-
lion dollar initiative campaigns are simply the norm.198 A rural state like
Montana, with its relatively low signature requirements to qualify an ini-
tiative or a popular referendum for the ballot, 199 may be seen as a "cheap
date" by national groups with a national agenda who can cultivate a repu-
tation for success, either by winning, as in the case of term limits, or by
coming close to winning, as in the anti-gay initiative in Oregon in
1992.200
Given the often one-sided and non-deliberative quality of the ballot
petition process, and given that the checks and balances found in repre-
sentative government are largely absent, the courts must necessarily play
a more central role as referees and gatekeepers. Magleby observed, "Un-
like the legislative process, in which bicameral legislatures, decentralized
decision making, and the threat of a gubernatorial veto function as
checks against unconstitutional and excessive legislation, direct legisla-
tion is checked in its excess only by the courts. '201
What criteria have the courts used in deciding whether to intervene
and possibly nullify a ballot proposition, especially a petition for referen-
dum which suspends an enacted law?
According to Zimmerman, courts may intervene and nullify popular
referendums for the following reasons:
The proposition in dispute contains more than one
question;
197 MAGLEBY, supra note 9, at 59-65. See also Ernest Tollerson, In 90s Ritual, Hired
Hands Carry Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1996, at 1, 6 (illustrating the widespread and
almost exclusive use of paid signature collectors to place initiatives or candidates on the
ballot).
198 See, e.g., Leo Wolinsky, $23 A Vote, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1989, at 3, 23 (analyzing
the spending by an insurance company to defeat auto insurance initiatives in California).
199 For example, supporters of a constitutional initiative to impose term limits on state
elected officials spent only $59,000 to successfully win approval of their proposal. See MON-
TANA COMMISSIONER OF POLITICAL PRAcrIcES, CAMPAIGN FIANNCING (Ed Argenbright ed.,
1992).
200 The drive to impose term limits in Montana was largely paid for by two Washington,
D.C. groups, Americans to Limit Congressional Terms and U.S. Term Limits, Inc. These two
groups accounted for 73% of contributions to the Montana group, Citizens For CI-64. Id. at
843-44. See also Telemarkerters Push For Term Limits, GREAT FALL TRIB., Apr. 14, 1992, at
3B; Tom Laceky, National Term Limits Leader Boosts Voter Initiative, GREAT FALLS TRM.,
Sept. 27, 1992, at 3B; Bettina Boxall, Gay Rights Foes Take To Ballot Again, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1994, at 14 (regarding an Oregon drive).
201 MAGLEBY, supra note 9, at 194.
1997]
416 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
" The ballot language is misleading and/or the voter in-
formation pamphlet explaining what the proposition
means is misleading or uninformative;
" Evidence shows that fraud was used in the gathering
of signatures to place the issue on the ballot;
* That the ballot issue could not be voted on or sus-
tained after a favorable vote because the subject was
excepted from a public vote by state law (e.g., appro-
priations discussed above); or
" The proposed law would in fact adversely impact the
rights of citizens under the Equal Protection Clause,
and if inadvertently approved by the voters, would
easily fail a test in the courts. 20 2
Considerable debate exists concerning under what circumstances
and with what constitutional criteria courts should intervene in the initia-
tive and referendum process. 203 There appears to be, however, a general
consensus that courts should exercise great deference.204 Gordon and
Magleby take the most cautious approach in urging a broad policy of
non-intervention:
[Tihere are extreme examples in which pre-election re-
view of substantive validity should also be allowed.
While the values that argue against pre-election review
are very important, they are not absolute, and in special
circumstances they can be outweighed by serious injury
to other fundamental public values. Therefore, there
should be a "circuit breaker" exception to the general
principle of judicial nonintervention. In cases involving
a present, significant, irreparable injury to a fundamental
public interest, the court should be able to review pre-
election challenges to substantive validity. The excep-
tion should be as limited as possible to reflect the appro-
priate deference for the legislative process, and should
not be invoked if less onerous alternatives are available
to avoid or mitigate the injury.205
Eule, in contrast, advises that courts take a "hard look" at direct
ballot issues, especially popular referendums, because:
202 See generally ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 78-85.
203 See, e.g., Priscilla Gunn, Initiatives and Referendums: Direct Democracy and Minor-
ity Interests, 22 URB. L. ANN. 135 (1981); Hans Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not
Republican Government, 72 OR. L. Rnv. 19 (1993).
204 James Gordon & David Magleby, Pre-Election Judicial Review of Initiatives and Ref-
erendums, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 298, 318 (1989).
205 Id. at 318.
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In several ways the popular referendum has the potential
to be the most dangerous of direct democratic devices.
Like the mandatory referendum [where state constitu-
tions or statutory law require a public vote, e.g., school
bond issues], it affords the opportunity for inflamed ma-
jorities to take away the gains that minority groups have
struggled to achieve through the representative system
[initiatives and referendums to repeal gay rights ordi-
nances come to mind] .... [A] court willing to review
these electoral vetoes would have to rely on a thesis
never accepted by a Supreme Court decision - that
"4mere repeal" of a single piece of legislation unaccom-
panied by a boarder restructuring of the political deci-
sion-making process can itself violate the Constitution.
For the present, however, the threat of popular referenda
is purely speculative. Because the time period for gath-
ering the requisite signatures tends to be short - typi-
cally no more than ninety days after adjournment of the
legislative session that produced the law - the device
has seldom been used. 20 6
But in Montana, the deadline for obtaining signatures to suspend a
contested law and forcing a public vote is a relatively permissive six
months after enactment.20 7 Further, Referendum 112, because it is ac-
companied by suspension gained by winning the signatures of a small
minority of voters (as few as six percent of the registered voters), repre-
sents a clear negation of the majority rule principle in that the majority,
or even an equivalent minority of voters, have no procedural recourse
with which to stop suspension.208
Further, the success of the Natelson effort in Montana invites the
use of the suspension-referendum process in other places and for other
issues in addition to taxes. The opportunity for mischief is great given
that the topics excepted from the suspension by the minority are few in
all states that permit it. In addition to chilling legislative attempts to
impose new taxes or increase old ones, curtailed revenue possibilities
may compel state legislatures to cut existing programs and services. Fur-
thermore, the things most likely to be cut affect the interests of the least
powerful and most despised constituencies, e.g. the poor, racial minori-
ties, and homosexuals. Indeed, the use of fiscal means to implicitly re-
duce governmental obligations to certain relatively powerless groups
206 Eule, supra note 88, at 1578-79.
207 Choi, supra note 12, at 337.
208 Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 96, at 11-12.
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avoids troublesome constitutional guarantees safeguarded under the
Equal Protection Clause.
More to the point, the suspension-referendum process invites direct
assaults on disadvantaged groups by permitting those who object to "spe-
cial rights" to suspend newly enacted laws designed to recognize explic-
itly the civil rights and common citizenship of certain groups. For
example, most states have enacted "hate crime" statutes which include a
sentence enhancement component for bias-motivated criminal acts. 20 9
But relatively few explicitly identify criminal assaults on homosexuals as
a "bias" requiring a sentence enhancement.210 Suppose a state legislature
decides to amend its hate crime statute to include gays and lesbians; in
those states that provide for suspension of an enacted law, there is every
likelihood that extension of hate crime penalties to those who commit
crimes based on hostility toward homosexuals could be suspended pend-
ing a public vote.21'
Eule would advocate courts to take a "hard look" at the suspension
of an enacted law based upon the law's substantive content.212 This ap-
proach, however, invites a great deal of needless definitional controversy
over what is and what is not a "fundamental right" or a "suspect classifi-
cation." In a critique of the "hard look" school represented by Eule,
Professor Robin Charlow stated, "Either state and local plebicitary
processes are constitutional forms of lawmaking or they are not. If they
are constitutional, a particular group's dissatisfaction with the perceived
efficacy of these processes should not, in and of itself, warrant different
constitutional treatment of the products of these processes." 213 Under the
arguments advanced by appellants in Nicholson, the "products" of sus-
pension are not the issue; rather, the issue is the process of suspension of
enacted law by a minority of voters.214
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution, who welcomed the use of
supermajority voting requirements as a way of protecting minority inter-
ests in especially critical decisions, might reasonably be appalled by the
209 STEVEN M. FREEMAN, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, HATE CRIME LAWS (1994).
210 Id. at 30-31.
211 Recall that 20 states permit the suspension of an enacted law. Of these, only one
(Michigan) currently includes sexual orientation as a catagory protected under its hate crime
law. In all, 15 states currently include sexual orientation under bias-motivated crime. See id.
In its 1993 session, the Montana Legislature considered and rejected a bill to include sexual
orientation under the state's malicious harassment law. Instead, the state legislatures, heavily
pressured by anti-homosexual lobbyists and perhaps their own particular prejudices, even re-
fused to include sexual orientation as a catagory for reporting alleged hate crimes. See LEois-
LATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 45, and MONTANA ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WHirE SUPREMACIST ACTIVITY IN MONTANA (1994).
212 Eule, supra note 88, at 1549.
213 Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem of Plebiscites, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 527, 557 (1994).
214 Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 96, at 11-13.
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creation of a process like suspension-referendum which installs the pos-
sibility of a minority veto even over the most ordinary processes of gov-
ernment (e.g. taxation and the extension of civil rights laws). In this
regard, Alexander Hamilton said:
To give a minority a negative upon the majority... is, in
its tendency, to subject the greater number to that of the
lesser ... .215 The public business must in some way or
other go forward. If a pertinacious minority can control
the opinions of the majority, respecting the best mode of
conducting it, the majority, in order that something may
be done, must conform to the views of the minority; and
thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of
the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings.
Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and in-
trigue, contemptible compromises of the public good.216
In the Federalist No. 58, Hamilton again addressed the dangers of
institutionalizing minority rule saying:
In all cases where justice or the general good might re-
quire new laws to be passed, or active measures to be
pursued, the fundamental principle of free government
would be reversed [referring to a requirement of
supermajorities in the ordinary transaction of business].
It would no longer be the majority that would rule: the
power would be transferred to the minority. Were the
defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an inter-
ested minority might take advantage of it to screen them-
selves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or,
in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable
indulgences. 217
These commentaries, though they specifically apply to problems of
state representation in the U.S. Congress, apply with even greater force
to the constitutional problem presented by the suspension-referendum
process.
Nationwide, the anti-tax, anti-government movement appears to be
growing and confident as minorities of angry anti-tax citizens attempt to
"screen themselves" from taxes which they object to.218 These efforts,
where successful, have had chilling effects. In Arizona in 1992, for ex-
215 THm FEDERALIST No. 22, at 131, 135 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Modem Library,
1937).
216 Il at 136.
217 Tim FEDERALIST No. 58, at 361 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Modem Library, 1937).
218 Voters Rebel Against Status Quo, supra note 24, at 18.
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ample, voters approved an initiative requiring a supermajority vote to
impose new taxes. A proponent says that it has achieved its desired ef-
fect: "[T]hese days the legislators don't even bother to propose new
taxes."21
9
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the character and implications of the refer-
endum-suspension process. The suspension of an enacted law raises se-
rious constitutional concerns, especially in relation to the Equal
Protection Clause, and under any reasonable interpretation, suspension
by a minority of voters clearly violates the one person-one vote require-
ment first enunciated in the reapportionment cases. Further, the popular
referendum device demands a hard look at the populist and reformist
assumptions upon which it is based. There is substantial evidence that
voters are not prepared to exercise their lawmaking responsibilities and
that direct democracy can be easily used to advance the causes of the
very "special interests" that initiative and referendum were designed to
counter.220
In the absence of more detailed constitutional limits in state consti-
tutions establishing where the popular referendum-suspension instrument
may not be used, we may expect to see its increasing use in the years
ahead by not only anti-tax groups but also by other intense minority in-
terests capable of effectively mobilizing the extremist tendencies always
found among some sectors of the electorate. It is therefore imperative
that the courts examine closely whether the suspension-referendum pro-
cess conforms to the Equal Protection requirements laid down in Reyn-
olds and subsequent cases. The suspension under the popular
referendum device is clearly violative and ought to be done away with
altogether, retaining for all of the people the right to vote on contested
laws.
219 Stephen Moore & Dean Stansel, The Great Tax Revolt of 1994, REASON, Oct. 1994, at
23.
220 MAGLEBY, supra note 9, at 121.
